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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS AS APPLIED TO EUPHEMISM 
ELISABETH LEINFELLNER 
820 South 13th 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68508 
in natural languages there are various ways of indicating the probable 
character of sentences: (i) by simply adding operators like "probably," 
"perhaps," and so on; (ii) by using the subjunctive; (iii) by using the future 
tense: and (iv) by forming sentences which - intentionally or unintentionally 
_ do not express adequately the situation under consideration. An example 
for (iv) is for instance the sentence "The situation looks good" when in 
reality it is rather not so good. There are, of course, mixtures between (i), (ii), 
(iii), and (iv) possible. One of the linguistic differences between (i). (ii), and 
(iii) on the one hand and (iv) on the other hand is, that case (iv) can lead to a 
change of meaning. (iv) comprises those expressions of natural languages 
whIch we call "not literal," "figurative," and the like. It is obvious that at 
leasT case (iv) may be explained best by a probabilistic semantics. As a 
specific example of (iv) we will discuss here euphemism and add one 
tradilional explication of "euphemism:" a euphemism is a pleasant way of 
referring to something unpleasant; a kakophemism, by the way, is simply the 
opposite of a euphemism. 
For theoretical reasons we will in general exclude euphemistic words and 
expressions shorter than a sentence, and also religious euphemisms 
(Lein fellner, 1971). Only when we will explain the change of meaning we will 
return to the concept of euphemism as a single word. 
We will modify here the standard method of allotting probabilities to 
sentences, where a sentence is probable with respect to another one, P(S1, 
S2) = r, by using a relation of euphemistic difference, e, which is to be 
founded pragmatically. The difference between the cases (i)-(iii) and (iv) thus 
lies also in the pragmatic foundation or nature of e: i.e. in order to explain 
case (iv) we have to take into consideration the personal attitude of the 
speaker, the language user in general. In the following model of euphemism 
we have to assume that there exists always an empirically true sentence B -
for practical reasons we exclude here empirically false sentences --- which is 
empirically true with respect to the same empirical situation to which the 
euphemistic sentence E refers euphemistically: e(E, B) = r. e has two limit 
cases: a euphemism ceases to be one when r = 1; and it turns into a total lie 
when r = O. In the case that r lies between 0 and 1, O<r<l, we have a 
euphemism. If we could compute r, we could compute the absolute 
euphemistic shift, either of the sentence E, or, as we will see later, of the 
euphemistic meaning compared to the basic or empirical one. It is also clear 
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that we can insert between 0 and 1 various degrees of euphemistic 
"efficiency;" they are topological values of variously "shaded" euphemisms. 
Let us show this in an example: There exists a political euphemism - which 
by the way, can be found in at least three different languages - "Th~ 
situation is grave but by no means hopeless," (Leinfellner, 1971 :56, 116)in 
case the situation is already hopeless. We can now form a sequence of 
euphemistic expressions which proceeds from the almost true euphemism (i) 
to an almost false one, (v): (i) "The situation is almost hopeless;" (ii) "The 
situation is extraordinarily serious;" (iii) "The situation is grave but by no 
means hopeless;" (iv) "The situation is decisive;" (v) "The situation looks 
quite good," and so on. Thus we get a topological grading of various 
euphemisms with respect to one sentence B. But since we cannot measure the 
absolute euphemistic shift, we try to measure the relative one; the latter 
actually expresses adequately the euphemistic effect of a given euphemistic 
sentence. Simplified we proceed as follows. We present a euphemism, for 
example a political one, to two groups of participants, each of them 
consisting of ten persons. Group 1, the specialists or experts, consists of 
people, who have, so to speak, more judgment; in the case of a political 
euphemism group 1 is for example a group of journalists, politicians, political 
scientists, and so forth. Group 2 consists of "ordinary" citizens, laymen; their 
judgment is supposed to be less clear. Group 1 estimates and accepts the 
euphemism with a coefficient of s = 0.1, group 2 with a coefficient of s' = 
0.9. We can now form the euphemistic difference D, expressed by the 
absolute value s - s'. The euphemistic difference can never be greater than l;it 
is relative to the time t, the groups in question, and the like. When the 
euphemistic difference is 0, the euphemistic effect is 0; the euphemistic effect 
is maximal, when the euphemistic difference is 1 (Leinfellner, 1971: 63). 
Here now is the point where the need for a probabilistic semantics and a 
clarification of the concept of meaning may arise. If we look at our 
formulation e(E, B) = r more closely, we realize that when we talk about E 
we actually talk about the "sense" of E, the linguistic or expanded contextual 
meaning of E; and when we talk about B, we actually have in mind the 
empirical meaning of E itself. What is -- in our theory - empirical meaning? 
Quine says in "Meaning and Translation" that empirical meaning is that what 
remains when we peel away the words (Quine, 1964). But what is that what 
remains? For our purposes - and I repeat again - for our purposes it is . 
sufficient to identify the empirical meaning of a specific empirical term, word 
with the designatum; this has to be based upon the relatively constant 
connection of word and designatum by means of a one-one relation of 
designation which is applied by the language user. The empirical meaning of a 
sentence is given if(f) (i) the conditions for the empirical meanings of the 
words are fulfilled; (ii) there exists a one-one relation of designation between 
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the sentence as a whole and the empirical situation, holistic system, etc. 
which is to be described; and (iii) the empiricaltruth conditions are fulfilled. 
In the case of the empirically false sentence, the sentence, of course, refers to 
the type-bound empirical opposite of what the sentence says. 
For the contextual or linguistic meaning of the words and sentences we 
use the semantics in the form Abraham and Kiefer (1966) have developed. We 
can outline it here only very roughly. Abraham-Kiefer's semantics coincides 
in some points with Katz-Fodor's, but avoids many of the shortcomings of 
the latter; it is also less clumsy. In this theory the, so to speak, codified 
contextual meaning of a word a - which is actually a codified set of contexts 
of a - appears as a matrix with one row and as many columns as there are 
seman tical and also syntactical categories. This matrix can be thought of as 
being one path in Katz-Fodor's semantic graph, with exclusion of the 
semantic distinguisher. It is obvious that this matrix will be a specific kind of 
reachability matrix. After various formal procedures the matrices of various 
words can be united in one large matrix; thus they form together a 
meaningful sentence. This matrix is actually the linguistic or expanded 
contextual meaning of the sentence in codified form. It follows that if we 
have i matrices for one sentence that the sentence is i times ambiguous. If two 
sentences share a matrix, they are synonymous. Since the matrix codifies the 
use of language it is at the same time also a formal expression of 
Wittgenstein's meaning in use. 
If we add these explications to our model of euphemism, we see clearly 
that euphemistic sentences, unlike metaphorical ones, are - from the 
standpoint of linguistic semantics - not semantically anomalous; they "make 
sense." Only the listener to or the reader of such a sentence confuses or at 
least should confuse its linguistic meaning with its empirical one. 
Here I have to add a warning: One should not expect too much from a 
purely linguistic semantics; in my opinion it is necessary that linguistic 
semantics always has to be complemented by a descriptive one, even though 
we can separate linquistic and empirical meaning for the purpose of analysis 
(Leinfellner, 1969: 232). 
We can now apply our model to meanings; for this purpose we have to 
define empirical meaning by a kind of definite description. We assume that 
there is a relation between the empirical and the linguistic meaning of a 
sentence; this relationship can be interpreted probabilistically. If we take 
speaker and listener, or writer and reader into consideration, we get the 
following classifications. In order to simplify the situation we operate here 
with degrees of compatibility rather than with a probabilistic relationship: 
1. In the case of the factually true sentence empirical and linguistic 
meaning have to be completely compatible; they have to match. 
2. If they are completely incompatible, the sentence is false, or, if we 
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take the speaker or writer into consideration: the sentence is a total err 
or, a 
total lie, or a total irony. 
3. If they are partially compatible, and if we take the speaker or Writ 
into consideration, then we get either a euphemism, a kakophemism, a parti~ 
irony perhaps in the form of an understatement (understatements are ofte 
viewed as ironies), a partial error, or a partial lie. Since the sentences of thin 
paragraph can be held apart only pragmatically - this holds true also fos 
some of the sentences from group 2 - it is possible to enhance a partial lie b r 
saying it was meant to be an irony, and the like. Y 
Euphemism is one of the meaning changing devices of natural languages. 
If the language users employ the same euphemistic word - the one which 
infects, so to speak, the whole sentence and makes it to a euphemistic one_ 
again and again for a certain event, thing, etc., then various linguistic 
situations can be the result, e.g. the old, not euphemistic word disappears and 
the euphemism takes its place. That means that the formerly euphemistic 
word looses its euphemistic effect and becomes stabilized in new contexts: a 
change of the linguistic meaning has taken place, and, as to the empirical 
meaning, a new relation of designation appears. It can also happen that 
simply a new lexical or contextual meaning is added to already eXisting ones. 
Given this situation it might become necessary to coin a new euphemism: 
during the war in Vietnam the expression "search and destroy" was changed 
to "search and clear," and later to "reconnaissance in force." 
If we go back to the concept of the contextual meaning of a word as a 
vector, a one-row matrix, then it is clear that during the time when the 
change of meaning takes place there must exist at least two vectors, and that 
they must occur in a certain statistical distribution. 
One final, rather hypothetical remark: It seems that the idea of 
contextual meaning as developed in Abraham-Kiefer could be used to 
formulate a finite-state semantics which could be applied to word meanings 
and on the sentence level to immediate constituents of two or three members. 
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